The entrance to Dien Bien Phu had resembled the battlefield of 1954, I imagined as my bike chugged through crater-like potholes, since the road had been entirely dug up to facilitate the laying of a new one. We checked in at the Viet Hoang Hotel (VND150,000 for my own room), where the owner's son provided great entertainment. We walked through the door to find no adults around, only a young boy clad in a blue singlet sitting behind the counter. He was extremely worldly-wise and had something of Del Boy about him as he demanded our passports while taking phone calls, cracking jokes and laying down the rules of the hotel to us. I asked him if he was the boss, at which he laughed, and eventually his mother and father appeared, beaming proudly at their son. The reason for the thirteen-year-old Ho's prominence was of course his English language proficiency; he proudly informed me of his attendance at school before asking me to help with his homework. I had thought that I was on holiday...
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| The Muong Thanh Bridge. |
Dien Bien Phu has fascinated me for the reasons to which I alluded in my Singapore post. It's a seminal, oft-forgotten event in the twentieth century and was ground-breaking in what it signified. Martin Windrow said in his book The Last Valley:
"[It was] the first time that a non-European colonial independence movement had evolved through all the stages from guerrilla bands to a conventionally organized and equipped army able to defeat a modern Western occupier in pitched battle."
For the uninitiated, the Battle (or Siege) of Dien Bien Phu took place between March and May of 1954. The French were trying to re-assert their supremacy in Indochina, whereas the Viet Minh were striving for an independent Vietnamese state, and a confrontation was inevitable. Since the Viet Minh were running supply lines to and from Laos, the French decided to disrupt this by building a fortress in the then-village of Dien Bien Phu, hoping to draw Vo Nguyen Giap, the general of the Viet Minh forces, into a pitched battle. The rationale for this lay in a previous encounter at Na San in 1952, where Giap had attacked a French outpost and failed miserably, and in the French commanders' belief that Giap could not bring heavy artillery through the mountains and jungle to Dien Bien Phu.

Although the city has changed a lot since 1954, it is easy to see its strategic significance. It lies on a plain close to the Lao border, surrounded by mountains and hills on all sides. The Vietnamese government has, in recent years, pumped a lot of money into the city in order to develop it as a regional capital, and it is clear, from the outside, that the city has a bright future. And yet, despite this, it is its past which remains at the forefront, with vestiges of those brutal two months everywhere in the shape of museums, cemeteries, memorials and battle sites.
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu was effectively won by the Viet Minh before it had even begun. Giap had learned from his mistake at Na San, which was to make a full-frontal assault on French positions without heavy artillery. Recently armed by the Soviet Union with this weaponry, Giap had cunningly arranged for porters carry the artillery in pieces through the jungle and, upon reaching Dien Bien Phu, had ordered the guns to be positioned in dug-in emplacements (on the advice of the Chinese), which were immune to counter-fire and air raids. The battle began in earnest on March 13, 1954, with Viet Minh artillery bombardment of French positions. The French had assumed that the Viet Minh could not carry out such a strategy and were distraught when the reality faced them, with the French artillery commander, Colonel Charles Piroth, committing suicide in his bunker when he realised that his artillery was helpless against that of the Viet Minh.
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| The site of Col. Piroth's bunker, where he blew himself up with a hand grenade. |
Under pressure from the Viet Minh, Col. de Castries, the French commander at Dien Bien Phu, received paratroopers to reinforce the French positions. However, supplying these posts became more and more difficult due to the Viet Minh's possession of anti-aircraft guns, so supplies were being dropped from greater heights and were not necessarily received. The situation became increasingly desperate for the French, with rumours of insubordination by de Castries' lieutenants and the Viet Minh forces remaining strong and loyal despite incurring huge casualties in full-frontal infantry assaults on French positions.
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| de Castries' bunker. |
The Viet Minh enjoyed great success against the French, over-running most positions and inflicting heavy casualties on them, mainly as a result of their tactics (including inducing the Tai troops to desert their French comrades, which was successful) and French blunders, which had included using fatigued battalions rather than fresh ones. Soon, however, the battle reached a stalemate, since French rearguard action and devastation of Viet Minh regiments with artillery had checked Giap's plans, leading to trench warfare not seen since the Great War, the remnants of which were still evident on A1 Hill (Éliane to the French).


In short, despite the French resistance, the Viet Minh proved to be too strong for their would-be overlords, over-running the final French position on 7 May, 1954. Eleven thousand French Union personnel were captured and Ho Chi Minh went to the Geneva Conference the next day with his hand mightily improved. The French had been utterly destroyed; the grovelling letters in the Dien Bien Phu Museum from French soldiers to Ho Chi Minh, begging to go home, are startling to say the least. Until that point, the French had been the colonial overlords. Now they were at the mercy of Ho Chi Minh, whom they addressed as "Monsieur le Président" and to whom they apologised for taking his time by bothering him with their letters.
The Vietnamese, according to themselves, lost only four thousand troops, while the French estimate that they killed twenty-three thousand Viet Minh. The majority of these casualties are interred in the Dien Bien Phu War Cemetery, a monumental graveyard in the centre of the city. The exterior is classically Vietnamese and includes an outstanding frieze which documents the Viet Minh victory, from the lugging of the artillery through the jungle to de Castries coming from his bunker, hands up, as a Vietnamese soldier waves the flag on the roof.

The French memorial is a rather more low-key affair. In fact, it wasn't unveiled until around eighteen years ago, mainly because the French had attempted to forget this nadir. Also, the French dead at Dien Bien Phu were buried beneath what are now rice paddies, so a cemetery was out of the question. The memorial lies off the same road as the Muong Thanh Bridge and de Castries' bunker, though it is on the opposite side of the road to that indicated by Lonely Planet's map.
Finally, overlooking the city and visible from the main boulevard running in and out of town, there is a monumental statue which illustrates the two sides of war. One side of the statue illustrates the joy of victory, with soldiers waving a flag and holding a child aloft. The other side of the statue features a grim-looking soldier holding a machine gun, a potent reminder of the nation's readiness to meet all comers head-on.


Why have I dwelled for so long on Dien Bien Phu? Well, the first reason is its historical significance on a global scale. The Viet Minh's destruction of French designs on Indochina represents the first time a colonised people evolved from guerrilla resistance to a fully-equipped army capable of defeating Western armies on the battlefield. This was huge: the damage done to France was so great, in my view, that she never fully recovered from it, mainly in terms of global standing. Her allies viewed the defeat by Vietnamese communists as disastrous and rather embarrassing (the Americans saw it first-hand, for they were aiding the French at Dien Bien Phu), while in France a political crisis sprang up (precipitating the creation of the Fifth Republic) and other colonies saw their chance to get away. Morocco and Tunisia had broken away from France within two years, Algeria within six and the French Union had disintegrated within ten years. For the Vietnamese, the victory gave them national pride, dignity and sovereignty, something which they were loath to relinquish, as the Americans found to their cost ten years later (seemingly disregarding the French's experience when entering the Second Indochina War). There are some parallels with my comments on Britain after Singapore, but the key difference is that the Japanese were an established power, whereas the Viet Minh had long been regarded as little more than a Communist militia.
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| The museum, Dien Bien Phu. |
Secondly, the people of this city are more than aware of its significance in their country's history. A number of people in Dien Bien Phu asked me what I thought of the city and, when I replied that I thought that it was very pleasant, they would earnestly mention its history, encouraging me to visit the sites. Such pride and awareness is both refreshing and compelling; in my view, anyone wishing to understand the birth of this nation must visit Dien Bien Phu, for this is really where it all began for modern Vietnam, and it helps to contextualise much of what happened later in her turbulent history.